

Cab
106

TOP SECRET-

BRIEF SUMMARY OF OPERATION
OVERLORD
AS AFFECTING THE ARMY

CLOSED
UNTIL

1975

- (1) General Montgomery's Address to General Officers
on 7th April 1944.
(AL 508/2)

- (2) General Montgomery's
Address of 15th May, 1944
(AL 508/2)

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PERMANENT PRESERVATION.
CITED IN OFFICIAL HISTORY

1031

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL STAFF
HISTORICAL DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16th May, 1947.

Dear *Harry*

As requested in your letter of the 6th May, I return herewith the copies of the notes made by Monty for his addresses at St. Paul's School on the 7th April and 15th May 1944.

Dr. Pogue is writing to you to thank you for obtaining these documents for him. He has had them photostatted for reference purposes only.

Yours *W*

H. V. Wakelam

Brigadier H. Latham,
Offices of the Cabinet,
Historical Section,
8 Barton Street,
London, S.W.1.

Please return to H. V. Wakelam.

*WV
20/5*



BIGOT 3

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 8A

AL
508/

Brief Summary

of

Operation "OVERLORD"

as affecting the Army.

This is an exact reproduction of the original. General Montgomery's pencil alterations on the original have been reproduced in this copy.

MOST SECRET

Exercise THUNDERCLAP

Address by C-in-C.

1. This Exercise is being held for the purpose of putting all General officers of the field armies in possession of the whole outline plan for OVERLORD, so as to ensure mutual understanding and confidence. Secrecy is vital; far too many people know far too much about things that do not concern them. The greatest care is necessary from now on. Especially must we all beware of people who are trying to find out things and who resort to the "confidence" trick, and other similar methods.

Object of OVERLORD

2. The object of OVERLORD is to secure a lodgement on the continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. It is not an isolated operation but is part of a larger strategic plan designed to bring about the total defeat of GERMANY by means of heavy and concerted assaults upon GERMAN occupied EUROPE from the U.K., the Mediterranean and RUSSIA.

The Allied Team

3. This is an Allied operation, being carried out by BRITISH and AMERICAN forces with the forces of our other Allies cooperating. It is a great Allied team and none of us could do any good without the others. The Supreme Commander, or captain of the team, is GENERAL EISENHOWER. For the initial operations I am GENERAL EISENHOWER'S ground force-commander. ADMIRAL RAMSAY is the naval force-commander. AIR CHIEF MARSHAL LEIGH-MALLORY is the air force-commander. All General officers must understand that H.Q. 21 Army Group is an Allied H.Q. exercising operational command and control over the land forces of the Allies, under the Supreme Commander.

The Intention.

4. To assault simultaneously:-
 - (a) immediately north of the CARENTAN estuary.
 - (b) between the CARENTAN estuary and the R. ORNE with the object of securing as a base for further operations a lodgement area which will include airfield sites and the port of CHERBOURG.

The Enemy Situation.

5. The present enemy situation in the WEST will be known to you. The present number of identified enemy Divisions is 55, of which 8 are Pz or PG. What the situation will be by D day is not certain. We shall keep very close touch with the changing situation.
6. Since ROMMEL toured the "Atlantic Wall" the enemy has been stiffening up his coastal crust, generally strengthening his defences, and re-distributing his armoured reserve. The present general trend of movement of his mobile reserves is SOUTH i.e. away from the NEPTUNE area; this shows that our target is not yet known to the enemy.

7. ROMMEL is likely to hold his mobile Divisions back from the coast until he is certain where our main effort is being made. He will then concentrate them quickly and strike a hard blow; his static Divisions will endeavour to hold on defensively to important ground and act as pivots to the counter-attacks.
8. By dusk on D - 1 day the enemy will be certain that the NEPTUNE area is to be assaulted in strength. By the evening of D day he will know the width of our frontage and the approximate number of our assaulting Divisions; it will be quite evident that ours is a major assault. The enemy is likely that night to summon his two nearest Panzer Divisions to assist.
9. By D + 5 the enemy can have brought in 6 Panzer Type Divisions. If he has decided to go the whole NEPTUNE hog, he will continue his efforts to push us into the sea. We ourselves will have 15 divisions on shore by then. After about D + 8 I think the enemy will have to begin to consider a "roping-off" policy i.e., trying to stop our expansion from the lodgement area.
10. The GERMANS seem to be trying to insulate the WEST from the mounting disasters on the EASTERN front. No enemy division has left the WEST for the EASTERN front since January; two Panzer Divs have actually arrived in FRANCE from RUSSIA since then. But already the Russians have affected OVERLORD in two ways:
- (a) the build-up in the WEST is no longer increasing to the extent hitherto; though nothing is going away, nothing much is coming in.
 - (b) the ultimate build-up from other fronts against OVERLORD during its first two months was estimated in January at 15 divisions; it is now estimated at 6.
11. I suggest we should plan in general on the enemy having a round total of 60 divisions, of which 10 will be Panzer or P.G.
12. Some of us here know ROMMEL well. He is a determined commander and likes to hurl his armour in to the battle. But according to what we know of the chain of command the armoured divisions are being kept directly under RUNSTEDT, and delay may be caused before they are released to ROMMEL. This fact may help us, and quarrels may arise between the two of them.
13. When considering the estimated rate of enemy build-up against us, no regard is paid to the effect of air attack on enemy reserves - especially in movement. This cannot be disregarded. But the enemy build-up can become considerable from D + 4 onwards; obviously therefore we must put all our energies into the fight and get such a good situation in the first few days that the enemy can do nothing against us.

Preliminary Air Operations

14. Certain preliminary operations are to be carried out by air forces, and these will be explained by the Air C-in-C when he speaks to us. As regards the Air, the main requirements from an Army point of view are as follows:
- (a) destruction of the enemy air forces.
 - (b) destruction and disruption of communications so as to impose delay on enemy movement towards the lodgement area.

/(c)

- (c) mislead the enemy as to the real point of attack.
- (d) destruction of certain specified targets such as coastal batteries, etc.

These air operations have already begun.

Army Tasks.

15. Four armies are taking part in the operations:

First U.S. Army	}	Assault armies.
Second British Army		
First Canadian Army	}	Follow-up armies.
Third U.S. Army		

The order of battle of these armies can be seen on the diagrams.

16. The tasks given to the armies are as follows:

First U.S. Army.

- (a) To assault astride the CARENTAN estuary.
- (b) To capture CHERBOURG as quickly as possible.
- (c) East of CARENTAN, to develop operations southwards towards St LO in conformity with the advance of Second British Army.

After the area CHERBOURG - GAUMONT - VIRE - AVRANCHES has been captured, the Army will be directed southwards with the object of capturing RENNES and then the ports of NANTES and ST NAZAIRE.

establishing our flank on the R. LOIRE.

Second British Army.

To assault to the west of the R. ORNE and to develop operations to the south and south-east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First U.S. Army while the latter is capturing CHERBOURG.

In its subsequent operations the Army will pivot on its left and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement area from the east.

First Canadian Army.

This Army will land after the Second British Army and will take over from it the left or northern sector of the lodgement area. The troops of Second British Army in the area so taken over, probably one Corps, will come under command First Canadian Army.

Third U.S. Army.

This Army will land after First U.S. Army and will have the tasks:

- (a) of clearing the BRITTANY peninsula and capturing the BRITTANY ports.
- (b) as soon as the BRITTANY and LOIRE ports have been captured, of covering the south flank of the lodgement area while the First U.S. Army is directed N.E. with a view to operations towards PARIS.

The Sea-borne Assault

17. The existing resources in landing ships and craft are contained in five Naval Assault Forces, and two Naval Follow-up Forces. These forces have been allotted in support of Armies as follows:

First U.S. Army

Two Assault Forces } Lift of approximately
One Follow-up Force } 8,700 vehicles.

Second British Army

Three Assault Forces } Lift of approximately
One Follow-up Force } 10,900 vehicles.

The total lift is some 20,000 vehicles, all of which will be landed on the first, second, or third tides.

18. The forces to be carried in the initial lift are as follows:

First U.S. Army.

Three Infantry Divisions (Assault)
Five Tank Battalions (Assault)
Two Ranger Battalions.
Army and Corps Tps, and Naval and Air overheads.

Second British Army.

Three Infantry Divisions (Assault).
Three Tank Brigades (Assault)
One Armoured Brigade
One Infantry Division (less two Inf Bde Groups)
Two S.S. Bdes.
Army and Corps Tps, and Naval and Air overheads.

19. The assault will take place on D day on an eight Brigades/
Regimental Combat Team, front.
H hour will be nautical twilight + 90 minutes, but this may change.

First U.S. Army

Assaults on a front of three Regimental Combat Teams.

Second British Army.

Assaults on a front of five Infantry Brigades.

Details are shown on the diagram, and Army Comds will explain the plans later.

The Fire Plan.

20. The object of the fire plan is to get the Army on shore and for this purpose the chief requirements are as follows:

(a) the destruction or neutralisation of enemy coast artillery batteries that might interfere with the approach of the convoys, or shoot up the anchorages.

/(b)

- (b) the neutralization of enemy strong points and defended localities that might bring fire to bear on the beaches.

Very good naval support is available, as will be explained by the Naval C-in-C. Direct air assistance to the assault is being provided by the Allied Air Forces up to the extent required by the Navy and the Army. All are agreed that the Army must be got on shore and all three services are doing everything in their power to ensure this. The Air C-in-C will explain the air action when he speaks to us.

Commandos and Rangers

21. First U.S. Army

Two Bns of Rangers are to land at H hour on the right of 5 Corps sector, to move WEST, and deal with enemy batteries and defences to the EAST of the CARENTAN estuary.

Second British Army

- (a) 4 S.S. Bde with two Commandos will land with 1 Corps at H hour and clean up the area between 3 Canadian and 3 British Divisions. The Commandos will then move inland and seize the bridges over the R. SEULLES which runs between 1 and 30 Corps.
- (b) 1 S.S. Bde to land in 3 British Div Sector. One Commando will clean up OUISTREHAM. The remainder of the Bde will move inland, cross the R. ORNE by the bridges at BENOUVILLE, and attack in rear and destroy the enemy coast defences to the east of the R. ORNE up to CABOURG inclusive.
- (c) Two commandos 4 S.S. Bde will be held in reserve.

Airborne Forces.

22. First U.S. Army.

- (a) 101 Airborne Div will land in rear of the VARRAVILLE beaches prior to H hour, and will assist 4 Div in capturing its objectives.
- (b) 82 Airborne Div will land about *the same time as* ~~24 hrs after~~ 101 Div in the area shown on the diagram, with the object of preventing the movement of reserves into the CARENTAN peninsula.

Second British Army.

6 Airborne Div (less one Bde) will be landed to the East of CAEN prior to H hour. Its task will be to seize the bridges over the R. ORNE at BENOUVILLE and RANVILLE and, in conjunction with 1 S.S. Bde, to dominate the area lying east of CAEN so as to hold up and delay enemy movement towards that place.

23. The problem with airborne troops is to land enough troops to do the job, and to land them in the right place. I have laid down that the smallest number to be landed in any one place, at one time, is a Bde; and far better to land a whole Division. Once airborne troops have done their job, they must be collected into reserve for use again as soon as they are refitted.

24. Once the initial operations are over, airborne troops will be used to keep the battle moving by means of "air hooks" of not less than a Brigade; see para. 38.
25. The whole of 1 British Airborne Div will be in reserve, plus one Bde of 6 Airborne Div.
26. A total of some 1,500 S.A.S. troops will be dropped on the night D - 2/D - 1 in a belt 40 to 50 miles from the coast from the south of BREST to BELGIUM, with the tasks of attacking Divisional areas and interfering with the movement of reserves.

Development of Operations

27. You will see from the diagram on the wall how the land battle will be developed.

Phase 1.

28. Phase 1 is shewn in GREEN.

In this Phase the First U.S. Army and Second British Army secure the whole area included within the green line. This gives us a good base for subsequent operations. I estimate we may have this area by D + 20, and we will fight continuously till we get it. There may then have to be a pause to see how we stand administratively; if not, so much the better.

Phase 2.

29. Phase 2 will then begin, and the operation will be developed as shewn by the YELLOW lines.
30. 8 Corps from Third U.S. Army will be brought in through CHERBOURG and will come under First U.S. Army. ~~LOIRE~~
First U.S. Army will operate southwards towards ST NAZAIRE - NANTES
~~ANGIERS - LE MANS.~~
8 Corps (under First U.S. Army) will turn westwards into the BRITTANY peninsula.
31. Second British Army will push its left out towards the general line of the R. TOUCQUES. At the same time the Army will pivot on FALAISE and will swing with its right towards ARGENTAN - ALENCON. This Army will have completed landing by D + 17.
32. Third U.S. Army will be brought in after First U.S. Army. There are several alternatives:
- (a) through CHERBOURG and/or the VARRAVILLE beaches.
 - (b) through the LOIRE ports.
 - (c) through the BRITTANY ports.

Airborne landings may be undertaken to capture BRITTANY ports such as MORLAIX, so as to allow ships to come in. This operation is being worked out now - Operation SWORDHILT.
The task of Third U.S. Army will be to clear the BRITTANY peninsula.

33. I estimate that, if all goes well, we may have the area up to the Yellow line by D + 35 to D + 40.

/This would not

This would not include the complete cleaning up of the BRITTANY peninsula; the time for this is not possible to estimate with any likelihood of accuracy; it may take up to D + 60. ~~If we want to have free use of the LOIRE ports it may become necessary for First U.S. Army to secure a bridgehead south of the LOIRE.~~

Phase 3.

34. The positions to which the Armies will be directed is shown in black.
First Canadian Army will have taken over the left, or northern sector. It will then face up to the R. SEINE below ROUEN, will force the crossing of that river and will operate northwards towards ST VALERY so as to cut off and capture HAVRE. This will be called Operation AXEHEAD. The capture of HAVRE is essential; it is required for the maintenance of the British and Canadian Armies; if not captured fairly soon it will have repercussions on the U.S. build-up.

Second British Army

This Army will move forward towards the line of the R. SEINE between PARIS and ROUEN; it will protect the right flank of First Canadian Army south of the SEINE, while operation AXEHEAD is in progress.

First U.S. Army

Will be directed on PARIS, and the SEINE above the city. It will be prepared to cross the river and operate to the N.E.

Third U.S. Army.

Will operate on the right flank of First U.S. Army, and will protect its right or southern flank.

35. We might reach the black line on the diagram by D + 90.
36. The weight of air power available to support the development of operations will be very great. After the initial assault the tactical air forces will be directed against enemy reserves, movement on roads, defended centres of resistance, rear maintenance areas, and so on. Given close cooperation between the air forces and the land armies, I do not see how the enemy can stop us from developing the operations as we plan - if only we can get a good lodgement in the first four days and capture CHERBOURG quickly.

Rate of Build-up.

37. The general principle on which the build-up has been planned is to land on the continent the maximum number of fighting formations in the first few days; after that, Divisions are brought in consistently with maintenance and other factors. Flexibility has been introduced at the earliest possible moment so that the priority of fighting formations, as against overheads of all kinds, can be varied to suit operational conditions as they develop.

Some examples of the number of Divisions on shore in the early stages, and in later phases, are as follows:-

/U.S.

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>TOTAL.</u>
D Day (incl airborne)	3 $\frac{2}{3}$ rds	4	7 $\frac{2}{3}$ rds
D + 1 "	5 $\frac{2}{3}$ rds	4 $\frac{2}{3}$ rds	10 $\frac{1}{3}$ rd
D + 4 "	8 $\frac{1}{3}$ rd	6 $\frac{1}{3}$ rd	14 $\frac{2}{3}$ rds
D + 12 (excl airborne)	9	9	18
(GREEN) D + 20 "	9	15	24
(YELLOW) D + 35 "	15	15	30
(BLACK) D + 90 "	20	15	35

Further Airborne Operations

38. It is hardly possible to forecast airborne operations after the assault. But the following types of operations are envisaged and forces will be held in readiness in England and/or on the Continent - see para. 14:-
- (a) an attack on the BRITANNY ports by up to two airborne Divisions.
 - (b) airborne operations in conjunction with the crossing of the LOIRE and Operation AXHEAD.
 - (c) S.A.S. operations against vital objectives in the enemy's rear.
 - (d) Airborne landings in conjunction with a large scale breakthrough operation.
 - (e) deep penetration in the event of enemy disintegration.
 - (f) air "hooks" to keep the battle moving. See para 15.

Resistance Groups

39. The launching of the assault will be the signal for action by Resistance Groups in occupied territory. During the assault and the period immediately following it, action will be directed to hindering the movement of enemy reinforcements and harassing the enemy in back areas; these activities will be co-ordinated with those of the S.A.S. troops in areas where both are operating. As the battle develops it is anticipated that Resistance Groups may be able to seize control of certain areas where the ground and strategical situation is favourable. The co-ordination of Resistance will be in the hands of Special Force H.Q. in LONDON, working under the operational control of SHAEF. Special liaison staffs will be detached to work with Army H.Q.; these have their own W/T communications and can pass to Special Force H.Q. details of the ways in which commanders require their plans to be supported by Resistance Groups.

Engineer Problems

40. Beaches.

- (a) No underwater obstacles have yet been laid where they will be
/encountered

encountered before touch down. Naval and Marine teams are being trained in the removal of such obstacles.

- (b) There is so far no evidence of underwater beach mines. If they appear, the BOOKREST will be fired from LCA (HR) in front of the leading waves.
- (c) Clay outcrops occur in some sectors of the British front, about 100 yards from the back of the beach. Carpets are being provided to be laid over clay patches.
- (d) Heavy steel obstacles are appearing on the coast in some areas, from 50 to 400 yards from the beach i.e. above the point of touch down. These are not obstacles to infantry but may be a serious obstacle to craft of subsequent flights. The technique of clearing these obstacles is being studied i.e. by shooting at them, by charging with tanks, by mechanical equipment and by hand placed charges. More of these obstacles may appear, but the effort involved in their manufacture and transport to the site is very great.
- (e) Sea walls varying in height from 6 to 20 feet appear in some sectors. These will be dealt with by hand-placed charges by assault R.E., and mechanical equipment.

41. Obstacles to advance inland

Routes inland from the beaches are likely to be canalised by means of flooding, demolitions, craters, and so on. Rivers and streams will cause lateral obstacles.

Tanks and wheeled-vehicles may not find it too easy to debouch quickly from the beaches; but no obstacles that have yet been noticed could stop determined infantry from penetrating inland by the skilful use of ground and manoeuvre; infantry must act in this way, and outflank the enemy posts guarding the defiles.

42. Bridging.

Extensive enemy demolitions are likely and will cause major bridging problems. Between D day and D + 60, there will be landed 45,000 tons of bridging equipment.

43. Airfield Construction

The programme aimed at is:

<u>Date</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>British</u>
D + 3	2	2
D + 8	5	5
D + 14	8	10
D + 24	12	15

These figures are cumulative.

Four Aviation Bns U.S. Eng. } will be landed
 Five Airfield Construction Groups British } before D + 4
 One Field Construction Wing, RAF } will be landed
 before D + 30.

/Changes

Changes in the plan, or in the nature of the country, may well necessitate U.S. Aviation Engineers operating in the British Sector or vice-versa; the former is more likely as there is a good area for airfields south and S.E. of CAEN.

Complete flexibility of employment between British and U.S. Airfield Construction Units is therefore desirable; the problems of control and administration arising from this must be studied by all concerned.

44. General

It is obvious that the enemy will make every use of obstacle demolitions, and so on, to hamper our landing and to hold up and delay our penetration inland. Commanders must keep very close touch with this aspect of the problem; photography will disclose what is going on. We must not be misled because nothing very serious has appeared so far. All engineers are studying the problems as they arise, and some special types of equipment have been devised. Commanders must realise clearly that this equipment has not yet proved itself in battle. Sub-units of divisional engineers must be well forward and ready to lend a hand. And infantry must be quickly on the scene, using manoeuvre and ground, and so outflanking and by-passing obstacles, and thus making it easier for the engineers to do their work.

/MOUNTING ARRANGEMENTS.

Continued on Page 11.

MOUNTING ARRANGEMENTS

General

45. Responsibilities for mounting arrangements to conform to the operational plan are:-
- (a) War Office for British/Canadian troops.
 - (b) Air Ministry for RAF, except that War Office provides RAF marshalling facilities.
 - (c) ETOUSA for United States forces.
46. The general procedure for mounting the operation is laid down in the combined pamphlet "Overseas Movement. Instructions for Commanding Officers (Combined Ops - SSV)". This procedure is divided into three phases -
- (a) Concentration
 - (b) Marshalling
 - (c) Embarkation.

Concentration

47. Concentration is the locating of formations and units in areas from which they can move direct to marshalling areas.
- Movement to concentration areas is ordered by 21 Army Group, 2nd TAF and ETOUSA.

The distances between concentration areas and marshalling areas are governed by:-

- (a) Restricted mileage permitted after waterproofing.
- (b) Movement Control requirement that units must be concentrated within one day's march of marshalling areas.

The concentration plan is not yet firm, but it is anticipated that it will provide for the following:-

- (a) All formations (except Allied) being in concentration areas by Y - 21.
- (b) 10 - 12 days' estimated flow of Army Group, Army and Corps troops being concentrated by Y - 21.

The assault, follow-up and early build-up formations and units will have a pre-allocation of craft and/or shipping, and will in the majority of cases concentrate in marshalling areas.

Concentration of the subsequent build-up will be ordered by BUCCO (see para 59 below) according to the build-up tables or special operational requirements.

Marshalling.

48. In the marshalling areas all troops will be hotel serviced and organised into craft loads ready to be called forward to the embarkation points.

Embarkation

49. The coast is divided into various embarkation areas, each of which has a headquarters which controls a group of embarkation points.

In embarkation areas are embarkation regulating parks to which coast movement control call forward serials from marshalling areas for embarkation. This park acts as a regulating area to control the flow to embarkation points.

Briefing 12

Briefing.

50. Briefing will take place in marshalling areas under strict security arrangements. Special accommodation is provided. The time allowed is 4 days for assault, 24 hours for follow-up and 6-10 hours for build-up formations.

Models for briefing assault and follow-up troops are being made by teams from formations working under 21 Army Group direction.

Maps

51. The assault, follow-up and early build-up will draw maps from special depots established in and near marshalling areas. Build-up formations and units will use depots in concentration areas. Maps are issued in coded rolls which will be opened as late as possible, and only in marshalling areas prior to H hour.

Residues.

52. Formations and units up to approximately D + 17 and possibly later will embark at reduced scales. The portions which are left behind are known as residues, and are classified as follows, based on a percentage of the vehicle W.E. and approximately 3 personnel to each vehicle:-

- (a) Assault formations 40 - 60% - First Assault residues
- (b) Assault formations 60 - 75% - Second Assault residues
- (c) Other formations and units 75% - WE - Last residues.

Special provision is being made for the grouping, accommodation and administration of these various residues.

Command and Control

53. (a) Commanders and a small command post staff of headquarters down to brigades are not required to pass through the process of marshalling.
- (b) Mounting arrangements provide for cars to report to headquarters concerned in concentration areas which will enable commanders and their command post staffs to move about freely.
- (c) Waiting rooms adjoining the headquarters of marshalling areas and sub areas and embarkation areas, with suitable communications, are available for them to occupy on their way to embarkation.

Security

54. The principal security problem is the segregation of personnel who have been briefed prior to H hour. This problem will be further aggravated in the event of a postponement. This responsibility is left to Army Commanders who will order the wiring of camps as they consider necessary.

Postponement

55. Postponement may be of two types:-
- (a) Short postponement of one or two days during a suitable tide and weather period.
 - (b) A long postponement of about twenty-eight days between two suitable tide and weather periods.

/In the 13

In the event of a short postponement, troops on board LSI and LST will remain on board. Troops on LCI and LCT at alongside berths will be disembarked. Troops on LCI and LCT not secured alongside may be disembarked as determined by conditions prevailing at the time.

In the event of a long postponement, all troops, less maintenance parties for vehicles, will be disembarked and returned to marshalling areas which will be kept empty until the expedition sails. Vehicles will not be disembarked.

Protection.

56. 21 Army Group formations and units will be responsible for their own protection except in so far as AA protection is afforded by 'ADGB' (until arrival in marshalling areas), when it will become the responsibility of Home Commands.

AA defence is the responsibility of 'ADGB', but as many 21 Army Group AA formations and units as possible have been allotted to 'ADGB' until required for embarkation.

Assistance to Home Forces

57. Two mobile infantry brigade groups from the late build-up are being ear-marked as mobile reserves for Home Forces in case of raids by enemy ground or airborne forces. One brigade group will be located in KENT and the other in SUSSEX.

In the unlikely event of Home Forces requiring further assistance they will apply to HQ 21 Army Group.

CROSSEBOW

58. Home Forces have been asked to release 21 Army Group formations and units from as many of their CROSSEBOW commitments as possible, but it is probable that they will have to be accepted so long as formations and units are available. Allowing time for concentration, marshalling, and embarkation this is unlikely to be later than D + 9.

Build-up Control Organisation (BUCO).

59. BUCO is a combined and joint organisation of staff officers including representatives of the Service Ministries. Its function is to exercise the detailed control of the build-up which is necessary to implement the Commanders' plan. Broadly speaking it is divided into two parts:-

- (a) Representatives of the staffs of the Expeditionary Forces. This portion exercises control.
- (b) Representatives of the various movement agencies. This portion, collectively known as MOVCO, will issue the necessary executive movement instructions.

Execution of Mounting Plan

60. The time table of events leading up to initial embarkation and the build-up priority tables represent the Commanders' authority to Movements to put the general mounting plan into operation on notification to the Director of Movements at the War Office on D day. Any alteration in the build-up tables, as a result of operational requirements, will be submitted by Commanders concerned to BUCO who will put them into effect.

HEADQUARTERS

61. Locations on D day.

Supreme Commander	- (SOUTHWICK HOUSE or BROOMFIELD. Then to STANMORE.
Commander-in-Chief	- SOUTHWICK HOUSE or BROOMFIELD.
Main Headquarters, 21 Army Group	- SOUTHWICK PARK
Rear Headquarters, 21 Army Group	- ST. PAULS.
Main Headquarters, First U.S. Army.	- Afloat to land D + 1 (Going through Plymouth)
Main Headquarters, Second British Army.	- FORT SOUTHWICK.
ANCXF	- SOUTHWICK HOUSE.
ABAF	- STANMORE.
Second TAF	- UXBRIDGE.
9th United States Air Force	- UXBRIDGE.

Tactical HQ, 21 Army Group, will accompany Tactical HQ Second British Army overseas on D + 1 or D + 2, and set itself up in readiness for the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief.

Main HQ, 21 Army Group, will move overseas as soon as conveniently possible after the D + 20 phase line is reached. The area selected provisionally is near ST LO, which is central and has good signals facilities.

Rear HQ 21 Army Group will move overseas and establish itself close to Main HQ 21 Army Group as soon as conveniently possible. This is not likely to be before D + 21 at the earliest.

COVER PLAN AND DIVERSIONARY OPERATIONS.

Cover Plan.

62. The object of the Cover Plan is to:-

- (a) Before D day indicate a D day of D + 45 in order to encourage the enemy to reinforce other fronts on which he may be heavily engaged, at the expense of our own front.
- (b) From D day onwards make the enemy believe that we have retained in the SOUTH and SOUTH EAST of ENGLAND a force whose task is to attack the PAS DE CALAIS the moment that he has withdrawn his reserves from that area in order that we may pin these reserves there for as long as possible.

It is the task of 21 Army Group to implement this plan so far as it is possible with our own forces and the added assistance of Home Forces. The task of indicating a later D day is a difficult one which we have endeavoured to achieve by taking all possible security precautions, as well as by trying to persuade the enemy that our final operation will be

/yet 15

yet another rehearsal.

In order to achieve the second object, we shall endeavour to show the enemy that the First Canadian and Third U.S. Army under command of the First U.S. Army Group, are retained in EAST and SOUTH EAST ENGLAND for the purpose of being available to attack the PAS DE CALAIS area. Large numbers of dummy landing craft will be launched and moored in suitable areas in EAST and SOUTH EAST ENGLAND from shortly before until well after D day in order to give this potential threat its means of transport. It will be necessary to carry out a certain amount of wireless activity both by real and imaginary formations, in order to build-up a force required for the threat.

Diversions.

63. In order to distract the enemy during the night immediately preceeding the assault, it is intended that we carry out the following diversionary operations.

Sea

Three Naval diversions will be executed, these diversions being carried out by a small number of Naval craft whose special apparatus will be able to indicate to the enemy RADAR system, convoys of shipping.

The first diversion will be against the NORTH of the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. The object of this diversion will be to engage the enemy RADAR stations in that area in order to prevent them from being able to gauge the depth and therefore the strength of our assaulting forces. It should also cause the enemy shore batteries to dissipate their effort.

The second diversion is against the coast immediately NORTH of the SEINE, and will have as its object, the retention of the GERMAN forces in that area, and the creating of greater breadth to our assault forces which it is hoped will cause dissipation of the enemy coastal fire and air bombing. This diversion will be linked up with a large-scale Airborne diversion.

The third diversion will be against the PAS DE CALAIS area, and its object will be to confuse the enemy intelligence in order to delay his knowing that our only effort will be against the NEPTUNE area. It may also cause him to dissipate his bomber force.

All these diversions take place during the hours of darkness.

64. Air Diversions.

In order to retain enemy forces NORTH of the SEINE, and in order to endeavour to encourage the enemy armoured reserve, which is West of the SEINE, to move Eastwards, dummy paratroop droppings to simulate the dropping of one airborne div will be made in the area of LE HAVRE.

A number of smaller dummy airborne operations will take place elsewhere.

MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE POINTS

65. The administrative problem facing the US forces is entirely different from that of the British. The operational plan envisages the British forces remaining in reasonable proximity to their Advance Base whereas the U.S. forces have got to first make a rapid move to CHERBOURG and then turn South to capture NANTES and the LOIRE Ports. The development of the BRITTANY and LOIRE ports and the railways and roads to effect distribution of stores will put great strain upon the U.S. administration. In view of this no satisfactory comparison can be made between the tonnages required for the British and US forces since stores requirements for the development of the L of C in the U.S. sector are very large.
66. The limited capacity for the build-up of forces is likely to be the maintenance stores which can be landed. This will be governed by the acceptance capacity on the Continent as it is likely that transportation resources and shipping can be found to ensure that ports, MULBERRIES and beaches are working to capacity. There is, however, a limit to the number of coasters available, and this precludes the use of a number of ports in the BRITTANY Peninsula in which it is impossible to discharge deep draught shipping.
67. Should there be a serious and unexpected break in the weather before D + 14, this will have a serious effect on the maintenance of both forces. Plans for emergency maintenance have been made but this will not cover a prolonged spell. Previous experience does not, however, point to the likelihood of there being many days in succession at this time of the year when nothing can be unloaded. Between D + 14 and D + 90 it is not expected that the weather will be a limiting factor to the forces which can be maintained ashore. After D + 90 it must, however, be assumed that the weather will deteriorate and it is not practicable to plan for the British forces to be maintained during the winter months over the beaches. It therefore follows that the British must look to CHERBOURG and to MULBERRY 'A' for their maintenance until such times as the SEINE ports are captured.
68. The build-up of both forces is very rapid and it is essential that the British forces should advance sufficiently far East and South to allow room for the development of the RMA and administrative installations at as early a date as possible. Unless this is done very considerable congestion and some confusion will inevitably occur.
69. The British have no large port in their sector and are therefore, entirely dependent on the beaches and their MULBERRY. At a later stage it is envisaged that British will take over the US MULBERRY. It therefore follows that the successful maintenance of the British forces, until the capture of LE HAVRE and ROUEN is dependent on the successful construction and operation of these MULBERRIES.
70. It is not economic for the US forces to open all the small ports in the BRITTANY Peninsula and major ports only will be selected for development. It is not expected that maximum development of these will be achieved until after D + 60 and the advantage thus obtained will be offset by the necessity of the British use of CHERBOURG and MULBERRY 'A' until such time as these ports can be handed back to the US after capture of LE HAVRE and ROUEN.

/It therefore...17

It therefore follows that the speed of the subsequent build-up of the US forces depends on the date of capture of LE HAVRE and ROUEN.

In order to maintain their forces in the LE MANS area it will be necessary for the US to develop a long road and rail L of C from the LOIRE and BRITTANY ports in the West of CHERBOURG and the beaches in the North. The speed of the US advance will depend on the speed with which this L of C can be developed.

Note - A large outline sketch map will be prepared to show the main administrative installations.



Copy

21 A. Gp/

508/2

Address given by General Montgomery
to the General Officers of the four field Armies
on 15 May 1944

Brief Presentation of Plans before The King

1. Object of OVERLORD.
2. General Eisenhower has charged me with the preparation and conduct of the land battle.

My HQ is an Allied HQ, exercising operational command and control over the land forces of the Allies.

There are 4 Armies under my command:

First American	}	Assault Armies
Second British		
Third American	}	Follow up.
First Canadian		

3. The intention.

To assault simultaneously

- (a) immediately north of the CARENTAN estuary.
- (b) between the CARENTAN estuary and the R. ORNE

with the object of securing, as a base for further operations, a lodgement area which will include airfield sites and the port of CHERBOURG.

A port is essential for our administration; initially we want CHERBOURG and later HAVRE.

The Enemy.

4. Last February Rommel took command from HOLLAND to the LOIRE. It is now clear that his intention is to deny any penetration; OVERLORD is to be defeated on the beaches. To this end ROMMEL has:

- (a) Thickened up the coastal crust.
- (b) Increased the number of infantry divisions committed to beach defence, and allotted them in a lay back role to seal off any break in the coastal crust.
- (c) Redistributed his armoured reserve.

5. There are now 60 enemy divisions in FRANCE, of which 10 are Panzer type. 12 are field infantry, mobile.

There are 4 Pz divs in or near the NEPTUNE area:

21 Pz - CAEN
12 SS - LISIEUX
17 SS - RENNES
Lehr Div - TOURS

6. The immediate situation is 5 divisions opposing us initially:

Two coastal - one opposite each Army
One field Inf - ST. LO
One field Inf - COUTANCE
One Pz - CAEN (21)

By 1200 hrs D Day.

The Pz Division from LISIEUX could be on the scene (12 SS)

TOTAL - 6.

By dusk on D Day.

(Ourselves
7²/₅)

The Pz Div from RENNES could be appearing (17 SS)

We should be fighting hard against 6 divisions, with one more Pz Div from RENNES approaching - to be effective on D + 1.

7. By dusk on D + 1.

Two more Pz divisions can arrive:

(Ourselves
10¹/₃)

One Pz - TOURS (Lehr)
One Pz - NANTES (116)
M. [M. NANTES GASSICOURT on R. Seine] App.
Total 9. of which 5 are Pz.

8. By D + 2.

Same number;

(Ourselves
12)

But by now OVERLORD will have become an overriding menace requiring the concentration of all available formations that can be spared. 13 divisions may begin moving to the NEPTUNE area:

5 Pz (from AMIENS, TOULOUSE, BORDEAUX, SEDAN, BELGIUM)
8 Inf (from W. BRITANNY and PAS de CALAIS).

9. By D + 5.

(Ourselves
15)

The 13 divisions mentioned in para. 8 may not yet all have arrived. But the enemy is beginning to have the necessary

/ingredients.

ingredients for a full scale counter-attack after proper recce and deployment - with infantry holding essential ground and 10 Pz divisions available for the blow. The full blooded counter-attack is likely at any time after D + 6.

10. By D + 8.

(Ourselves
18)

The total number of enemy divisions can now be up to 24 - of which 10 are Pz. The majority will be securing the vital ground forward of the lateral which links his front and which controls the essential routes and nodal centres. The Pz divisions will have the mobile role to push us back into the sea.

11. Rommel is an energetic and determined commander; he has made a world of difference since he took over. He is best at the spoiling attack; his forte is disruption; he is too impulsive for the set-piece battle. He will do his level best to "Dunkirk" us - not to fight the armoured battle on ground of his own choosing, but to avoid it altogether by preventing our tanks landing by using his own tanks well forward.

On D Day he will try to:

- (a) force us from the beaches.
- (b) secure:-

CAEN
BAYEUX
CARENTAN

In relation to NEPTUNE his obsession is likely to be BAYEUX; this important nodal point splits our frontal landings in half.

If he can hold firm in the above three nodal points, we would be awkwardly placed.

12. Thereafter he will continue his counter-attacks. But as time goes on, he will combine them with a roping-off policy, and he must then hold firm on the important ground which dominates and controls the road axes in the "bocage" country.

The areas in question are:

- (a) the high ground east of the R. DIVES.
- (b) the high ground between FALAISE and ST LO, between the rivers ORNE and VIRE.
- (c) the high ground west of the R. VIRE.

The Problem

13. The enemy is in position, with reserves available.

There are obstacles and minefields on the beaches; we cannot gain contact with the obstacles and recce them.

/There are

There are many unknown hazards.

After a sea voyage, and a landing on a strange coast, there is always some loss of cohesion.

14. We must time our assault so as to make things as easy as possible for the leading troops. Therefore we shall touch-down so that all obstacles are dry, and so that we have 30 minutes in which to deal with them before the incoming tide reaches them.

The Solution.

15. We have the initiative.

We must then rely on:-

- (a) the violence of our assault.
- (b) our great weight of supporting fire, from the sea and air.
- (c) Simplicity.
- (d) Robust mentality.

16. We must blast our way on shore and get a good lodgement before the enemy can bring sufficient reserves up to turn us out. Armoured columns must penetrate deep inland, and quickly, on D day; this will upset the enemy plans and tend to hold him off while we build up strength.

We must gain space rapidly, and peg out claims well inland.

And while we are engaged in doing this the air must hold the ring, and must hinder and make very difficult the movement of enemy reserves by train or road towards the lodgement area. The land battle will be a terrific party and we will require the full support of the air all the time, and laid on quickly.

17. Once we can get control of the main enemy lateral GRANDVILLE-VIRE-ARGENTAN-FALAISE-CAEN, and the area enclosed in it is firmly in our possession, then we will have the lodgement area we want and can begin to expand.

Army Tasks.

18. First U.S. Army (front of 3 combat teams)
Second British Army (front of 5 Inf Bdes)
First Canadian Army
Third U.S. Army
Commandos and Airborne Troops.

/Development of Operations.

- 5 -

Development of Operations.

19. Up to D + 90.

Morale.

20. We shall have to send the soldiers in to this party "seeing red". We must get them completely on their toes; having absolute faith in the plan; and imbued with infectious optimism and offensive eagerness. Nothing must stop them. If we send them in to battle in this way - then we shall succeed. Leading troops must be very lightly equipped.

B. L. M.

APPENDIX TO

AL 508

BIGOT

26

TOP SECRET

COPY N°...2.

HS/2199/TS/1/1

Revised

MAPS

EXERCISE THUNDERCLAP




7 April 1944

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


DEVELOPMENT OF LAND BATTLE



TOP SECRET

BOMBARDMENT DIAGRAM



ASSAULT AND BUILD-UP

TOP SECRET


29

THIRD ARMY
 15 CORPS
 2 DIV (from Ireland)
 5 DIV
 6 DIV
 20 CORPS
 4 ARMD DIV
 5 ARMD DIV
 8 CORPS
 79 DIV
 85 DIV
 90 DIV (from 7 corps)

FIRST ARMY
 19 CORPS
 3 ARMD DIV
 30 DIV
 2 ARMD DIV
 7 CORPS
 8 DIV
 90 DIV

SECOND ARMY
 12 CORPS
 59 DIV
 53 DIV
 34 ARMD DIV
 43 DIV
 8 CORPS
 GUARDS ARMD DIV
 18 DIV
 31 ARMD BDE
 11 ARMD DIV

30 CORPS
 35 ARMD BDE
 49 DIV
 7 ARMD DIV
 30 DIV+
 8 ARMD BDE
1 CORPS
 51 DIV
 4 ARMD BDE
 two SS Bde's
3 CDNDIV
 2 CDNDIV
 3 SS DIV+
 27 ARMD BDE
ONE AIRBORNE DIV
 less one bde



CONCENTRATION AND MARSHALLING AREAS

TOP SECRET

